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Abstract: 
This study investigates the phenomena that dynamics in macroeconomic variables such 
as real output growth can be explained by changes or the removal of the person in 
charge of government, a phenomenon termed, government turnover. Using the 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average model (ARIMAX), the findings show that 
changes in head of government did not significantly explain variations in Nigeria‟s 
aggregate economy. In addition, changes in head of government correlated negatively 
with shifts in the economy. The political economy implication is that frequent changes 
in government (a measure of the extent of political instability) can affect negatively the 
aggregate economy. On the other hand, the insignificance of the political dummy 
variable measuring government turnover reflects either that: First, political shifts is a 
negligible source of fluctuation, secondly, that the Nigerian economy is resilient to 
absorb readily politically induced shocks and thirdly, that changes in head of 
government has an indirect impact on the economy. 
Keywords: Political Cycle, Government Change, Government Turnover,        
Fluctuations, ARIMAX  JEL Classification: E32, H11, H10 
 
I. Introduction 
Almost all nations experience a 
change in political governance at one 
point or the other. It includes a 
change from one political party, 
political ideology and 
president/leader. For instance, in 
May 2015, General Muhammad 
Buhari from a different political 
party and with a different political 
ideology became President after 
defeating Goodluck Jonathan of the 
People‟s Democratic Party that had 
ruled Nigeria since the return to 
democracy in 1999. Muhammad 
Buhari becomes the 14
th
 head of 
government in 55 years of post-
independence. This political outcome 
may induce changes in economic 
outcomes. Against this background, 
we investigate the phenomena that 
dynamics in macroeconomic 
variables such as real output growth 
can be explained by government 
turnover. Government turnover is 
defined as a change or removal of 
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the person in charge of government 
per time. A change of head of 
government implies that a new 
government with distinct policy 
preferences alters or abandons his 
predecessor‟s economic policies, 
which is then likely to disrupt 
economic outcomes. 
 
Based on the preceding argument, 
this study is largely related to the 
examination of Political business 
cycle. However, taking note of 
peculiarities of the structure of 
Nigeria‟s political economy 
structure, we argue that existing 
formal models of political business 
cycle are inadequate in explaining 
politically-induced fluctuation in the 
country. This is explained by the 
political business cycle literature 
currently existing along two strands: 
opportunistic and partisan. While the 
opportunistic school (Nordhaus, 
1975) see economic fluctuations as 
arising from politicians‟ 
manipulation of economic policies, 
for the purpose of re-election; the 
partisan variant (Hibbs, 1977)  
hypothesize that the ideologies (left 
or right winged) possessed by 
politicians, triggers an economy 
cycle as presidents are alternated 
between the left and right ideologies. 
 
One central implication deduced 
from the two current thoughts on 
political business cycle models, is 
that both strands are premised on a 
stylized democratic political 
structure within an electoral system. 
However, Nigeria‟s post-
independent political history presents 
a mix of civilian and military 
regimes, rather than a strictly 
democratic structure. A second 
anomaly between current political 
cycle theories and political reality in 
Nigeria depicts a nascent democratic 
institution where voters‟ decisions 
are unlikely to count in the election 
and re-election of politicians. For 
instance, the World Governance 
Indicator (2013) rates Nigeria poorly 
on Voice and accountability, 
Political stability and violence and 
Rule of law. This implies that 
politicians may not need to 
manipulate policies for re-election 
purposes as stated by the 
opportunistic view. However, there 
are positive indications that the 2015 
general elections in Nigeria largely 
reflected the decision of voters. In 
the third stance, we argue that unlike 
the partisan proponents, there are no 
clearly defined (left-right) ideologies 
among Nigerian politicians. For 
instance, there are many episodes of 
defection of politicians across 
political parties in Nigeria 
 
To address the three discrepancies 
identified in applying existing 
political business cycle (PBC) 
models to Nigeria, politically-
induced fluctuations is defined in 
this study as: the economy shifting as 
power is transferred from one 
president to another, not due to the 
manipulation of policies (Nordhaus, 
1975) or differing ideologies (Hibbs 
1977), but due to the distinct 
personal preferences of politicians. 
Personal preferences refer to an 
individual‟s personality traits and 
value that guides his choice. With 
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reference to politicians, they are the 
traits and values that determine the 
political choice of policies made by a 
politician (Carprara, Schwartz, 
Capanna, Vecchione and 
Barbarenelli, 2006). Based on this, 
the thesis of this paper is: for every 
change in government, an economy 
is bound to shift due to adjustments 
in preferences of a new government 
from its predecessor.  
By defining politically induced 
fluctuation as based on the personal 
preferences of politicians, this paper 
opines that existing empirical studies 
that have applied PBC theories to 
developing economies, especially 
Africa, may have ignored the fact 
that since politicians face little or no 
constraints in their decision making 
power (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson and Thiaichaoren, 2002), 
then macroeconomic outcomes are 
susceptible to politicians‟ choices 
and thus changes in these choices as 
government changes can distort the 
economy. Secondly, our stance in 
this paper, removes all forms of 
restrictions to situating PBC theories 
within the boundaries of electoral 
systems alone.  
 
Therefore, this paper investigates the 
phenomena that the turnover or 
changes in government regimes is an 
impulse to inducing economic 
fluctuations in Nigeria. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows: In 
section two, related literature is 
reviewed. Stylized facts on politics 
and economic fluctuations in Nigeria 
are presented in section three. In 
section four and five, the theoretical 
framework and technique of analysis 
is shown. Section six contains the 
estimation results. In section seven, 
we conclude. 
 
II. Review of Related Literature   
Research into politically-induced 
fluctuations sprang formally from the 
work of Nordhaus (1975). Nordhaus 
(1975) formalised the idea of an 
opportunistic political cycle. Under 
this framework, politicians induce 
economic fluctuations due to their 
re-election motive. In order to 
maximise his/her chances of re-
election, an incumbent politician is 
pressured to „manipulate‟ policies by 
implementing expansionary policy 
so as to reduce unemployment prior 
to election, and then austere policy 
measures, after elections. In a 
different dimension, the idea that 
parties have electoral ambitions that 
influence them to implement policies 
favouring their core constituencies 
(Hibbs, 1992) culminated into the 
Hibbs (1977) partisan or ideological 
cycle model. In this model, 
politicians or political parties who 
are either left wing or right wing 
alternate between expansionary and 
austere policies. Other notable 
contributions to the theoretical 
literature on political cycle sprang 
from the rational expectation models 
of Rogoff (1990) and Alesina and 
Sachs (1986) who introduced the 
rational variant of the opportunistic 
and the ideological cycle 
respectively. 
 
From the empirical angle, it was 
needful to subject existing theoretical 
models to empirical testing, in a bid 
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to confirm the validity of proposition 
of the existence of politically-
induced fluctuations. Empirical work 
in this research area focus on the 
central question: Does a political 
cycle exist?  
 
Nordhaus (1975) in his seminal work 
is the first to empirically test the 
existence of a political cycle. He 
tested his opportunistic model for 9 
countries, using annual 
unemployment data for the period 
1947-1972 in these countries with a 
non-parametric binomial probability 
method. Specifically testing the 
hypothesis that during an electoral 
period, unemployment should rise in 
the first half and fall in the second 
half, he failed to find evidence for 
his model in 4 of the 9 countries, 
found evidence in 3 countries only, 
while evidence on the remaining 2 
countries, remained inconclusive. 
This result suggests a bleak 
performance of his model to 
empirical testing. 
 
However, unlike Nordhaus (1975)‟s 
inconclusive result on opportunistic 
cycles, Hibbs (1977) in his study, 
found convincing evidence for the 
existence of partisan/ideological 
cycles. Specifically, Hibbs (1977) 
sought to test the hypothesis that 
shifts in political regime of 
government will be associated with 
gradual changes in economic 
variables. Using time series quarterly 
unemployment data for the United 
States  and Great Britain over the 
period 1948:1 to 1972:4, and with a 
Box-Tiao (1975) Intervention 
analysis, he showed that fluctuations 
in unemployment data were 
significantly influenced by the 
ideology of political party. His 
results show that under left wing 
government, unemployment reduced 
and inflationary trends gained 
momentum, than right wing 
governments. 
 
Following Nordhaus (1975) and 
Hibbs (1977), other empirical studies 
have followed with mixed empirical 
evidence on the existence of political 
cycles. For instance while Tufte 
(1978); Barberia and Avelino (2011) 
finds evidence, McCallum (1978) 
and Paldam (1979) (as cited from 
Alesina and Roubini (1992)) test the 
opportunistic model in the United 
States and OECD countries, 
respectively and failed to find 
evidence of political cycles 
 
However, in the empirical evidence 
of PBC models in Sub Saharan 
Africa and then, in Nigeria, we find 
sparse literature. This includes Block 
(1999) who used annual data for 44 
SSA countries over the period 1980 
to 1995 and finds evidence for cycles 
in policy variables such as fiscal 
deficits, expenditures, government 
consumption, etc. For him, Political 
business cycle may mean frequent 
reversals in fiscal and monetary 
policy reforms. Block‟s findings may 
be unsurprising since a portion of his 
study period (1989-1995) coincided 
with increased political transition in 
Africa. 
 
In a study on Nigeria, Tarawalie, 
Ahortor, Adenekan and Comte 
(2011) provide empirical evidence of 
the existence of political cycles in 
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Nigeria using annual data on real 
GDP growth, inflation rate, 
government expenditure, money 
growth and money/GDP ratio, over 
the period 1999 to 2007. However, 
this study differs from Tarawalie et 
al (2011) on several grounds. First, 
political cycle is defined in a 
different manner. While Tarawalie et 
al (2011) defines political cycle 
using the conventional opportunistic 
and partisan cycle, political cycle is 
defined in this study as the economy 
shifts that occurs when there is a 
change from one head of government 
to the other. Secondly, a longer time 
frame is used in this study (capturing 
both democratic and military 
regimes), as 1999 to 2007 (only 
democratic regimes) presents a short 
time frame to make any meaningful 
statistical conclusion.  
 
111. Stylized Facts: Politics and 
Economic Fluctuations in Nigeria 
Fluctuation in economic activity 
defined as deviation from trend 
growth in Real Gross Domestic 
Product (especially when triggered 
by unexpected changes), is an 
outcome that policymakers and 
politicians seek to minimize. For one 
reason, economic fluctuation implies 
that an economy deviates from its 
potential growth path, with the effect 
that it leads to decline in real income 
and welfare. Yet it turns out that as 
politicians seek to curtail distortions 
in the economy, they are also a 
potential source to it. In this section, 
preliminary statistical facts on the 
link between politics and economic 
fluctuations are given to back this 
assertion. 
Figure 1 provides a time series plot 
of cyclical series on Real Gross 
Domestic Product (RGDP) from 
1960 to 2012. The cyclical series 
was derived from de-trended RGDP 
data on Nigeria using the Hodrick 
Prescott filter. Cyclical RGDP 
reveals an unstable pattern in real 
output for Nigeria, judging by the 
deviation of the cyclical series from 
origin. The figure also depicts that 
Nigeria has had more recessions than 
booms over the sample period.
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Fig I: Cyclical Component of Real GDP in Nigeria. 
Source: Authors‟ Compilation 
 
From a different but related stance, 
Lucas (1988) outlines many episodes 
of sudden and large changes in 
developing country growth rates, 
relative to developed countries, as a 
statistical regularity depicting 
fluctuation. Supporting the assertion 
of frequent changes, Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics on 
annual growth rates of RGDP in 
Nigeria. With standard deviation at 
80.4 accompanied by a mean value 
greater than 1, growth rates in real 
economic activity are volatile and 
subject to wide variability. 
.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Growth Rate in RGDP 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Growth rate in 
RGDP 
20.72 80.42 -16.99 550.53 
 
Turning to explaining political 
outcomes using past and current 
government regimes in Nigeria, one 
finds that Nigeria operates a federal 
system of government.  In this 
system, it has a central government, 
36 state governments and 774 local 
governments. The central 
government is the most powerful of 
the three tiers of government and 
controls most of Nigeria‟s resource 
Table two provides a summary of 
heads of government since 
independence. It presents statistical 
facts on the number of years in 
office, regime type (military or 
civillian) and ethnic origin (North or 
South) characterising the  personal 
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attributes of  past heads of 
government in Nigeria. These 
statistics were used to compute the 
following facts: 
 
Table 2:  Summary of Heads of Government in Nigeria 
 
Tenure Head of Government Number of 
years in 
office 
Regime type Geo-
political 
origin 
Nov. 1960- Jan 1966 
Jan 1966- July 1966 
August 1966- July 1975 
July 1975- Feb 1976 
Feb 1976-Oct. 1979 
Octo 1979- Dec. 1983 
Dec. 1983-August 1985 
Aug 1985- August 1993 
Aug 1993- Nov. 1993 
Nov 1993-June 1998 
June 1998- May 1999 
May 1999- May 2007 
May 2007-May 2010 
May 2010- present 
 
Nnamdi Azikwe 
Aguiyi Ironsi 
Yakubu Gowon 
Murtala Muhammad 
Olusegun Obasanjo 
Shehu Shagari 
Buhari Muhammad 
Ibrahim Babangida 
Ernest Shonekan 
Sani Abacha 
Abdulsalaam Abubakar 
Olusegun Obasanjo 
Musa Yar‟ Adua 
Goodluck Jonathan 
5 
0.5 
9 
1 
3 
4 
2 
8 
0.25 
5 
1 
8 
3 
4 (till date) 
Democratic 
Military 
Military 
Military 
Military 
Democratic 
Military 
Military 
Democractic 
Military 
Military 
Democratic 
Democratic 
Democratic 
South 
South 
North 
North 
South 
North 
 North 
 North 
South 
North 
North 
South 
North 
South 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
 
a. Between 1960 to 2010, Nigeria has had 13 heads of governments. This 
implies that over a duration of 50 years, 13 different persons have ruled 
Nigeria. Then on average, political regimes have lasted for 3.85 years in 
Nigeria. On comparing with the United States, one finds that between 
1961-2009, 9 presidents have ruled, and on average, a regime has lasted 
5.33 years. See Table 3 
     
 Table 3: Summary of Political Regimes in Nigeria, compared with US 
Country Number of leaders Duration Average years 
Nigeria 
United States 
13 
9 
50 
48 
3.85 
5.33 
      Source: Authors‟ compilation 
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a. Of the 13 political regimes, there have been 5 democratic regimes and 8 
military regimes. Of these, the 5 democratic regimes have lasted on average 
for 4.25 years, while the remaining 8 military regimes have lasted for 3.72 
years
 
   Table 4: Summary of Political Regimes by Regime Type 
Regime type Years ruled Average years 
Democratic 
Military 
29.75 
21.25 
3.72 
4.25 
    Source: Author‟s compilation 
 
b. By geo-polity, between the time frame 1960 to 2010, five (5) heads of 
government from the southern region have ruled Nigeria, while 8 heads of 
government from the north, ruled Nigeria. While Southern leaders ruled for 
16.75 years , the northern ones have ruled 34.25 years  
    Table 5: Summary of Political Regimes by Ethnic Origin 
Geo-political zone Years ruled Average years 
North 
South 
34.25 
16.57 
4.28 
3.35 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
Based on the average years ruled by 
each politician „type‟, one can say 
that there have been frequent 
changes in government in Nigeria. 
In summary, since 1960, Nigeria has 
experienced frequent changes in 
government such that, (a.) On the 
average, each head of government 
has ruled for 3.85 years only, 
compared with 5.33 years in the 
United States (b.) On the average 
each military and civilian 
government have ruled for 3.72 and 
4.25 years only, and (c.) On the 
average a south-led government has 
lasted 3.35 years compared with 4.28 
years of rule of a North-led 
government. 
An implication of stylized facts a-c is 
that every regime classification 
identified have lasted for a relatively 
short period in Nigeria (compared 
with an average of 5.33 years over 
similar range in the United States). 
This relatively short period of regime 
is interpreted as frequent changes in 
government. As a result of these 
frequent changes, and the 
accompanying short regime duration, 
Nigeria‟s economy is likely to be 
susceptible to distortions. 
Furthermore, assuming every 
successive regime in the country 
proposed new policy measures, these 
policies have 4 average  years to be 
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implemented, before being 
abandoned. 
 
IV. Theoretical Framework 
In addressing the objective, this 
study draws from Hibbs‟ Partisan 
model (1977). In this model, 
politicians or political parties are 
either left wing or right wing. While 
the left wing politician affiliates with 
the working class and proposes 
expansionary policies, the right wing 
politicians align with the interest of 
business class individuals and 
propose anti-inflationary measures. 
Economic fluctuations are therefore, 
induced by the alternation of power 
between the left wing and right wing 
politician. The underlying prediction 
of the Partisan model is that 
macroeconomic policy will be 
expansionary (reduce 
unemployment, increase output and 
inflation) under left wing politicians 
than right wing ones. 
 
The Partisan Model is relevant in 
defining Nigeria‟s political economy 
because Nigeria runs a variant of 
fiscal federalism where power is 
concentrated in the centre (i.e: 
executive arm of the presidency) 
while other institution of government 
possess limited influence and 
capacity. In this regard, heads of 
government face few constraints in 
their decision making power. Under 
this context, the President can 
personally take several policy 
decisions in response to the influence 
of interest groups. This has resulted 
in a macroeconomic policy 
environment susceptible to shifting 
and unpredictable outcomes that 
inhibits investment and broad-based, 
private sector growth (Utomi, 
Duncan and Williams, 2007; 
Acemoglu et al, 2002) 
 
From this, one can deduce that 
policy Choices are largely influenced 
by the personal ideologies of heads 
of government in Nigeria. This is 
because in countries with weak 
political institutions as Nigeria, 
where citizens are not actively 
engaged in the political process, and 
where elected officials are not 
responsive to the elements of 
governance (Natufe, 2006 
paraphrased); and where checks and 
balances on government discretion 
are absent (Acemoglu et al, 2002), 
policy formulation is likely to be 
individualized, without recourse to 
formal institutions (such as citizen 
participation) 
 
The facts that citizens‟ participation 
in political process is low and that, 
policy formulation is very likely to 
be individualized, is captured by the 
World Governance Indicator. This 
indicator rates six dimensions of 
governance: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption. In this 
context, we focus on Voice and 
Accountability that measures the 
extent to which citizens in a country 
participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, 
and free media (overall citizen 
participation); and on Control of 
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corruption that shows the extent to 
which public power is exercised for 
private gain and „capture‟ of the state 
by elites and private interests (how 
policy formulation are personalised 
for private gain). 
 
The percentile ranks for the period 
1996-2013 reveal that Nigeria ranks 
between 0 and 45 percentile for 
voice and accountability and 
between 0 and 35 percentile for 
Control of corruption, using a 
Percentile score that ranks worse 
governance lower and allots higher 
values to better governance. This 
confirms the exclusion of citizens in 
political decision making and also 
depicts that policy formulation and 
outcomes are captured by elites and 
private interests in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, interest groups 
especially ethnic-based ones, largely 
influence Policy choices in Nigeria. 
Since, in a multifaceted, ethnically-
diverse society as Nigeria, political 
decision processes are ethnic-based 
struggles over redistribution of 
national resources. With over 250 
ethnic groups and a post-colonial 
history of factional political conflict, 
the most intense ethnic divisions 
have historically revolved around the 
Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos, and the 
Yorubas. Moreover, the core division 
within the Nigerian polity over the 
past forty years pits the politically 
dominant Muslim states of the north 
against the economically advantaged 
“Christian” south (Polity IV, 2010). 
Inherent ethnic fragmentation has 
birthed political patronage in 
Nigeria. For instance, Utomi, 
Duncan and Williams (2007) opine 
that past leaders have used ethnicity 
as an easy tactic to mobilise support, 
and have then come under pressure 
to corner a share of national 
resources for their people (ethnic 
constituency). With deep-seated 
ethnic divisions, it becomes difficult 
for politicians and political parties to 
develop conventional left-right 
political ideologies. 
 
Based on the discussions above, this 
study adapts Hibbs (1977) Partisan 
model, albeit relaxing the following 
assumptions: 
1. Just as Hibbs (1977), this study 
assumes that political 
preferences of incumbent are 
the driving impulse of 
economic fluctuations. 
However, 
2. In Hibbs (1977), politician‟s 
ideology derives from the 
policy preferences of 
politician‟s political parties. 
Instead, this study adapts this 
assumption to Nigeria by 
proposing that incumbent 
Politician‟s ideology derive 
from his personal preference. 
3. While Hibbs (1977) classifies 
policy preferences of 
politicians along a left-right 
policy dimension. This study is 
silent on this classification, 
since there faint indication of 
this kind in Nigeria‟s politics   
4. While Hibbs (1977) assumes a 
well-developed democratic 
institution, we relax this 
assumption based on the fact 
that Nigeria has had a mix of 
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authoritarian and nascent 
democratic regimes over time. 
 
V. Technique of Estimation and 
Model Specification 
In line with the objective of this 
study, the existence of political 
cycles is tested using an atheoretical 
method. The atheoretical method 
specifies a model with little or no 
recourse to economic theory. Despite 
this, we find the section on the 
theoretical framework useful at 
defining the macroeconomic and 
political variables to be specified in 
the study‟s model.  
 
In actual testing of politically-
induced fluctuations, the empirical 
norm is to select relevant 
macroeconomic variables and then, 
check for the presence of politically-
induced cycles using the time series 
data of each variable. In this study, 
the variable: Real Gross Domestic 
Product growth rate (GRGDP) is 
used. By employing this variable, the 
implication is that political cycle is 
tested on economic growth rate in 
Nigeria. Then, the model specified in 
the study, takes the form where 
GRGDP is assumed to be a linear 
function of past lagged value of itself 
and intervention political dummy 
variables.  
 
Specifically, the model is specified 
in a Univariate Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMAX (p, q)) form. The 
ARIMAX (p, q) model is an 
extension of the Autoregressive 
Moving Average (ARMA) process 
with other time series as input 
variables. Succinctly, a variable  
follows an ARIMAX process if it is 
generated by past lagged values of 
itself, input variables and stochastic 
error terms. The input variables can 
be numeric or categorical. If 
categorical, the ARIMAX model is 
termed an intervention model. 
 
Following this, ARMA model with 
exogenous variables can be specified 
as: 
 
         (1) 
 
Where,  
:        Dependent variable 
:  Intervention component 
(Exogenous variable(s)) 
:       Noise component (ARMA 
structure) 
:       Parameter of Intervention 
component 
 
The ARIMAX framework is selected 
in this work, because of the intuition 
that as political regime changes, 
structural breaks are created in the 
economy. Then, the ARIMAX model 
is liable to identify such structural 
changes in economic series data as a 
result of this political change, as it 
assumes that mean shifts in time 
series are generated by a noise model 
and exogenous variables. The 
ARIMAX method used stems from 
Hibbs (1977). However, while Hibbs 
(1977) tests political cycle in 
unemployment data, we test political 
cycles on economic growth such 
that: 
 
    (2) 
 
Where  Real Gross Domestic 
Product growth rate 
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:         Y lagged p periods  
   Political dummy variable- 
proxy for change in government 
:          lagged Moving Averages 
of order q 
:               Constant term 
:             Parameter of AR (p) 
process 
 :             Parameter of MA (q) 
process 
:   Parameters showing the effect of 
a shift in political variables on  
Apriori expectation:  should be 
statistically different from zero at 5 
per cent 
Other underlying assumptions of the 
model include the following: First, 
variable  is weakly stationary. In 
ARIMAX modeling, the stationary 
criteria must be met so that estimated 
parameters are stable and well-
behaved.  In addition, the Exogenous 
Political variable  is assumed 
to be an intervention variable that 
induces changes in the endogenous 
time series. Ideally, intervention 
variables are represented as dummy 
variables. In this study,  is a 
dummy variable that is used to 
characterize the effect of changes in 
head of government on economic 
growth in Nigeria, such that shifts in 
the dummy variable (DUMP) are 
associated with changes in economic 
growth rates. 
 
In estimating the model specified in 
equation (2), a series of procedures 
are used. In general, the data on Real 
Gross Domestic Product growth rate 
(GRGDP) is fitted to the 
Autoregressive Moving Average 
model with exogenous variable 
ARIMAX (p, q), that was specified 
in equation (1) using the Box-
Jenkins procedure. The Box-Jenkins 
procedure is an iterative one with 
four stages: identification, 
estimation, diagnostic checking and 
forecasting. However, this study 
focuses only on the first three stages. 
 
In the identification stage, one finds 
the appropriate ARMA process by 
which the ARIMAX (p, q) model 
was generated. At this stage, the 
appropriate values of p and q are 
determined using an autocorrelation 
and partial autocorrelation function. 
The autocorrelation function and 
partial autocorrelation function are 
plots of the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation as a function 
of lags. The patterns of spikes or lags 
in these functions are understudied to 
arrive at the appropriate value for p 
and q. In the estimation stage, once 
appropriate order of p and q has been 
determined, then the parameters of 
the ARIMAX model are estimated 
using a Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator. The estimated parameters 
of the ARIMAX (especially 
intervention variable) model are 
expected to be statistically different 
from zero. In the context of this 
work, the statistical significance of 
parameter of the political exogenous 
variable (DUMP) is of primary 
importance. If this variable is 
significant, then political cycles are 
detected. 
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Finally, in the third stage which is 
diagnostic checking, one tests the 
likelihood that the estimated 
ARIMAX model is a reasonable 
good fit to GRGDP data. This stage 
requires that the residuals from the 
estimated models are white-noise. 
Upon evidence that the residuals are 
white-noise, the estimated model is 
judged adequate. 
Nonetheless, in estimating the 
ARIMAX model, it is not 
uncommon to discover several 
plausible models for a single time 
series variable. In this case, the best 
model within the „class of good 
models‟ is selected with recourse to 
the Akaike Information criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC). The most 
parsimonious model is one with the 
lowest value of AIC and BIC. It is 
worth mentioning that the 
advantages of the ARIMAX method 
are its capacity to identify structural 
breaks and patterns in time-series 
data and to quantify the impact of 
exogenous variables. Nevertheless, 
the ARIMAX model is not guided by 
any theory and is selected using a set 
of arbitrary assumptions, which is 
trial and error based and requires the 
expertise of the researcher. 
 
VII. Data Source and 
Measurement 
Annual data on growth rate of Real 
Gross Domestic Product (GRGDP), 
which is drawn from the Statistical 
Bulletin (2011 and 2012) of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria are used. In 
addition, the World Bank, World 
Development Indicator data on 
economic growth rate (RGDPGR) is 
used in the context of conducting 
robustness checks. Furthermore, two 
dummy variables (DUMP and 
DUMR) capturing government 
turnover and political regime type 
are constructed.  In this regard,  
DUMP is measured such that years 
in which a head of government is 
removed or changed is denoted 1 and 
0, if otherwise; while for DUMR, 
years in which the head of 
government is civilian is denoted 1 
and years of military rule is denoted 
0. 
 
VI. Estimation and Result 
The Results 
The specified model in equation (2) 
is fitted using the stated procedures 
of the Box-Jenkins Iterative Method 
as found in Section V. Thereafter, it 
is estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator such that:  
   (3) 
 
In fitting and solving equation (3) we 
are concerned with the significance 
or not of DUMP using the t-
statistics. Furthermore, an ARIMAX 
(2, 1, 2) model is fitted to the model. 
 
From Table 6, it is revealed that the 
political dummy DUMP is not 
statistically significant, since the t-
statistics value is less than 2. This 
implies that there is no evidence of 
the existence of political-induced 
changes in the Nigerian economy. In 
this regard, our finding differs from 
Tarawalie et al (2011), who find 
evidence of political cycle in 
Nigeria; but corroborates the finding 
of Oye (2014) that political cycle is 
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not a major source of economic 
fluctuation in Nigeria. Another 
dimension of the result reveals that 
DUMP is negatively related to the 
dependent variable GRGDP, which 
implies that overall, changes in head 
of government exerts negatively on 
the economy. 
 
. Table 6: ML estimation of Political Cycle in GRGDP 
Dependent variable:                 GRGDP 
               DUMP                                    -13.87 
                                                               (-0.14) 
                                                                
               Constant                                 -0.417 
                                                               (-0.10) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
 
A. Robustness Checks 
Two robustness tests are conducted 
to ascertain the validity of the result 
reported in Table 6. First we 
introduce another political dummy 
variable (DUMR) that characterizes 
the political regime type-civilian or 
military government- into the 
model. The addition of this variable 
helps to address any omitted 
variable bias that may be present in 
the model. After this exercise (see 
result in Table 7), the t-statistics of 
both political dummy variables, 
especially DUMP remain 
insignificant. Another test is carried 
out using the World Bank‟s WDI 
data on economic growth rate-
RGDPGR (see Table 8). The results 
also show the insignificance of the 
political dummy variable measuring 
changes in head of government. 
 
Table 7: ML estimation of Political Cycle in GRGDP with additional DV, 
DUMR 
Dependent variable:                 GRGDP 
               DUMP                                    -5.555 
                                                               (-0.11) 
 
               DUMR                                    45.15 
                                                               (1.18)                                               
               Constant                                  0.494 
                                                               (-0.10) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
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Table 8: Comparing ML estimation of Political Cycle in GRGDP and 
RGDPGR 
Dependent variable:                 GRGDP                         RGDPGR 
               DUMP                                    -13.87                           -2.112 
                                                               (-0.14)                           (-1.04) 
                                                                
               Constant                                 -0.417                            4.237 
                                                               (-0.10)                           (3.28)*  
t-statistics in parentheses   
*t > |2| 
Source: Authors‟ compilation 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to 
explain that economy-wide 
fluctuations in Nigeria can be 
explained by changes in head of 
government, over time. However, 
the empirical evidence reveal that 
changes in heads of government is 
insignificant and negative in 
explaining fluctuations in economic 
growth. Therefore, our findings do 
not support the existence of political 
cycle such that changes in 
government have had no significant 
effect on inducing changes in the 
economy. In short, government 
turnover exerted a negligible but 
negative effect on economic 
growth.  
 
On the one hand, the negative 
relationship between economic 
growth and the political dummy 
variable representing changes in 
government supports the hypothesis 
that frequent changes in 
government (measure of the extent 
of political instability) can 
negatively impact on the aggregate 
economy. On the other, the 
negligible impact of political 
dummy variable measuring 
government turnover reflects can be 
explained by three plausible 
reasons. Firstly, political shocks is 
negligible as a source of fluctuation 
in Nigeria. The second reason is 
that the Nigerian economy may be 
resilient to absorb readily, 
politically induced shocks; while 
the third and most important reason 
is that changes in government have 
no direct impact on the economy 
but exert an indirect effect via 
changes in the economic policy 
choices that accompany changes in 
heads of government over time 
(Hicksen, Satyanath and Sergenti, 
2005). Therefore future studies may 
consider the effect of changes in 
head of government on economic 
fluctuation via indirect channels 
such as changes in economic policy. 
 
Also, while this study examines the 
effect of politically induced changes 
on the economy using the 
atheoretical method of ARIMAX, 
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future studies can also address this 
subject based on theoretical 
frameworks as the Ramsey model 
or even, using Dynamic Stochastic 
Dynamic General framework.
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
1. ARIMAX Regression of GRGDP (Economic Growth) on DUMP 
                                                                              
      / s i g m a      7 9 . 0 6 3 9 1           .         .        .             .            .
                                                                              
         L 1 .     - 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 6    . 2 0 6 7 3 3 4     - 4 . 8 4    0 . 0 0 0     - 1 . 4 0 5 1 9 6    - . 5 9 4 8 1 5 4
          m a   
              
         L 2 .     - . 0 3 8 8 5 2 5    . 4 8 1 1 8 5 5     - 0 . 0 8    0 . 9 3 6     - . 9 8 1 9 5 8 7     . 9 0 4 2 5 3 7
         L 1 .      - . 0 0 1 3 0 6     . 2 7 7 3 0 4     - 0 . 0 0    0 . 9 9 6     - . 5 4 4 8 1 1 9     . 5 4 2 1 9 9 9
          a r   
A R M A           
                                                                              
       _ c o n s     - . 4 1 6 7 6 6 2     4 . 1 9 0 6 7     - 0 . 1 0    0 . 9 2 1     - 8 . 6 3 0 3 2 9     7 . 7 9 6 7 9 7
              
         D 1 .     - 1 3 . 8 6 9 3 9    9 9 . 0 8 3 6 3     - 0 . 1 4    0 . 8 8 9     - 2 0 8 . 0 6 9 7     1 8 0 . 3 3 0 9
        d u m p   
g r g d p          
                                                                              
     D . g r g d p         C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]
                               O P G
                                                                              
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 9                       P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0
                                                W a l d  c h i 2 ( 4 )        =      3 2 . 6 5
S a m p l e :   1 9 6 1  -  2 0 1 2                             N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =         5 2
A R I M A  r e g r e s s i o n
I t e r a t i o n  2 0 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B F G S )
I t e r a t i o n  1 9 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   ( n o t  c o n c a v e )
I t e r a t i o n  1 8 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   ( n o t  c o n c a v e )
I t e r a t i o n  1 7 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   ( n o t  c o n c a v e )
I t e r a t i o n  1 6 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   ( b a c k e d  u p )
I t e r a t i o n  1 5 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 8 7   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B H H H )
I t e r a t i o n  1 4 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 5 9 2   
I t e r a t i o n  1 3 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 6 7 0 2   
I t e r a t i o n  1 2 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 7 2 7 6   
I t e r a t i o n  1 1 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 0 9 9 5 9   
I t e r a t i o n  1 0 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 1 6 5 6 6   
I t e r a t i o n  9 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 3 8 2 3 3   
I t e r a t i o n  8 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 9 8 5 9 5   
I t e r a t i o n  7 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 2 7 6 9 2   
I t e r a t i o n  6 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 5 6 0 8 2   
I t e r a t i o n  5 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 6 6 3 8 4   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B F G S )
I t e r a t i o n  4 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 7 0 0 8 7   
I t e r a t i o n  3 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 8 2 1 2 6   
I t e r a t i o n  2 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 9 2 0 0 5   
I t e r a t i o n  1 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 9 7 3 4 2   
I t e r a t i o n  0 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 5 . 2 7 2 2 9   
( s e t t i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B H H H )
.  a r i m a  g r g d p  d u m p ,  a r i m a ( 2 , 1 , 1 )
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2. ARIMAX Regression of GRGDP (Economic Growth) on DUMP and DUMR 
                                                                              
      / s i g m a      7 7 . 2 2 9 4 1    7 . 9 0 3 8 3 5      9 . 7 7    0 . 0 0 0      6 1 . 7 3 8 1 7     9 2 . 7 2 0 6 4
                                                                              
         L 2 .      . 8 1 0 3 6 4 7    . 5 8 9 1 9 5 1      1 . 3 8    0 . 1 6 9     - . 3 4 4 4 3 6 4     1 . 9 6 5 1 6 6
         L 1 .     - 1 . 6 7 9 1 9 3    . 6 4 6 1 7 9 8     - 2 . 6 0    0 . 0 0 9     - 2 . 9 4 5 6 8 2     - . 4 1 2 7 0 4
          m a   
              
         L 2 .     - . 1 8 0 6 7 2 4    . 2 6 0 1 0 5 4     - 0 . 6 9    0 . 4 8 7     - . 6 9 0 4 6 9 6     . 3 2 9 1 2 4 7
         L 1 .      . 6 4 2 6 7 3 5    . 5 7 3 6 3 2 8      1 . 1 2    0 . 2 6 3      - . 4 8 1 6 2 6     1 . 7 6 6 9 7 3
          a r   
A R M A           
                                                                              
       _ c o n s      . 4 9 3 6 7 3 8    5 . 0 4 2 2 6 2      0 . 1 0    0 . 9 2 2     - 9 . 3 8 8 9 7 9     1 0 . 3 7 6 3 3
              
         D 1 .      4 5 . 1 4 7 7 5    3 8 . 1 4 9 5 2      1 . 1 8    0 . 2 3 7     - 2 9 . 6 2 3 9 4     1 1 9 . 9 1 9 4
        d u m r   
              
         D 1 .     - 5 . 5 5 4 8 7 1    4 8 . 6 8 1 8 6     - 0 . 1 1    0 . 9 0 9     - 1 0 0 . 9 6 9 6     8 9 . 8 5 9 8 2
        d u m p   
g r g d p          
                                                                              
     D . g r g d p         C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]
                               O P G
                                                                              
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 5                       P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0
                                                W a l d  c h i 2 ( 6 )        =     5 5 1 . 0 7
S a m p l e :   1 9 6 1  -  2 0 1 2                             N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =         5 2
A R I M A  r e g r e s s i o n
I t e r a t i o n  2 3 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 5 3   
I t e r a t i o n  2 2 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 5 4   
I t e r a t i o n  2 1 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 5 4   
I t e r a t i o n  2 0 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 5 8   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B F G S )
I t e r a t i o n  1 9 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 6 3   
I t e r a t i o n  1 8 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 6 6   
I t e r a t i o n  1 7 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 7 4   
I t e r a t i o n  1 6 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 8 9 2   
I t e r a t i o n  1 5 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 7 9 3 1   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B H H H )
I t e r a t i o n  1 4 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 0 . 9 9 9 5 2   
I t e r a t i o n  1 3 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 0 2 8 5 5   
I t e r a t i o n  1 2 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 1 0 2 5 5   
I t e r a t i o n  1 1 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 1 4 2 3 4   
I t e r a t i o n  1 0 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 1 8 8 5 7   
I t e r a t i o n  9 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 2 7 3 3 3   
I t e r a t i o n  8 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 3 3 8 2 1   
I t e r a t i o n  7 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 1 . 6 8 6 7 2   
I t e r a t i o n  6 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 2 . 6 0 4 9 2   
I t e r a t i o n  5 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 3 4 6 0 1   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B F G S )
I t e r a t i o n  4 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 3 . 4 4 3 7 8   
I t e r a t i o n  3 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =   - 3 0 3 . 9 7 7 5   
I t e r a t i o n  2 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 0 5 2 6 3   
I t e r a t i o n  1 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 4 . 9 2 2 6 1   
I t e r a t i o n  0 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 3 0 5 . 0 6 0 4 8   
( s e t t i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B H H H )
.  a r i m a  g r g d p  d u m p  d u m r ,  a r i m a ( 2 , 1 , 2 )
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3. ARIMAX regression of RGDPgr (World Bank data) on DUMP and DUMR 
 
                                                                              
      / s i g m a      5 . 6 2 6 3 9 9     4 0 4 . 4 8 5      0 . 0 1    0 . 9 8 9     - 7 8 7 . 1 4 9 7     7 9 8 . 4 0 2 5
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        d u m r      . 1 7 2 5 1 7 7    3 . 0 2 7 5 9 1      0 . 0 6    0 . 9 5 5     - 5 . 7 6 1 4 5 1     6 . 1 0 6 4 8 6
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r g d p g r         
                                                                              
      r g d p g r         C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]
                               O P G
                                                                              
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 6 7 8                       P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0
                                                W a l d  c h i 2 ( 5 )        =      5 9 . 4 1
S a m p l e :   1 9 6 0  -  2 0 1 1                             N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =         5 2
A R I M A  r e g r e s s i o n
I t e r a t i o n  1 3 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =   - 1 6 4 . 9 6 7 8   
I t e r a t i o n  1 2 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 6 7 8 1   
I t e r a t i o n  1 1 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 6 7 8 7   
I t e r a t i o n  1 0 :   l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 6 8 3 9   
I t e r a t i o n  9 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 7 4 0 7   
I t e r a t i o n  8 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 4 . 9 7 7 7 9   
I t e r a t i o n  7 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 5 . 0 2 1 2 4   
I t e r a t i o n  6 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 5 . 3 6 9 5 8   
I t e r a t i o n  5 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 5 . 5 2 6 9 8   
( s w i t c h i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B F G S )
I t e r a t i o n  4 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =   - 1 6 5 . 6 7 4 5   
I t e r a t i o n  3 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 6 . 2 2 4 2 9   
I t e r a t i o n  2 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 6 . 6 8 3 4 4   
I t e r a t i o n  1 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =  - 1 6 7 . 5 4 1 8 6   
I t e r a t i o n  0 :    l o g  l i k e l i h o o d  =   - 1 6 8 . 8 5 8 2   
( s e t t i n g  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t o  B H H H )
.  a r i m a  r g d p g r  d u m p  d u m r ,  a r i m a ( 1 , 0 , 2 )
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Diagnostic Check on ARMAX Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s compilation 
 
Note: AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; 
Q-test: Portmanteau Q-test  
Judging from the autocorrelation function plot of residuals and the associated 
Portmanteau Q-statistics, each ARMAX models fit the data well. The various 
spikes at different lags under the ACF residual plot are seen to fall within the 
shaded region. This implies that all the lags are not statistically significant. An 
indication of the insignificance of this test is that the residuals of the various 
ARMAX models fitted are white noise. Consequently, the models are „best‟ in 
their own right. 
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